Central bank independence during the Interwar period and its effects on inflation and Growth
Les effets macroéconomiques de l’indépendance des banques centrales pendant l’Entre-deux-guerres
Abstract
This article recalls the central banks independence experience during the interwar period. As in Cukierman, Webb et Neyapti (1992), we built a legal index and measured the governors’ turnover rate for eighteen central banks. We then tested the relation between these two indexes and the inflation or growth performances. Some results differ from those usually obtained for more recent periods. There is a significant inverse relation between independence and inflation performances only for the sub-period 1929-1938. An inverse relation between independence and growth performances is also observed for the sub-period 1923-1932, when independence level was at its highest.
Domains
Humanities and Social Sciences
Origin : Files produced by the author(s)
Licence : Public Domain
Licence : Public Domain