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Representing Pure Nash Equilibria in Argumentation

Abstract : In this paper we describe an argumentation-based representation of normal form games, and demonstrate how argumentation can be used to compute pure strategy Nash equilibria. Our approach builds on Modgil's Extended Argumentation Frameworks. We demonstrate its correctness, showprove several theoretical properties it satisfies, and outline how it can be used to explain why certain strategies are Nash equilibria to a non-expert human user.
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https://hal-univ-artois.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03426752
Contributor : Srdjan Vesic Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Friday, November 12, 2021 - 3:05:03 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, November 18, 2021 - 3:56:33 AM

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Bruno Yun, Srdjan Vesic, Nir Oren. Representing Pure Nash Equilibria in Argumentation. Argument and Computation, Taylor & Francis, 2021, pp.1-14. ⟨10.3233/AAC-210007⟩. ⟨hal-03426752⟩

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